"Homo profanus": Giorgio Agamben's Profane Philosophy. by Deladurantaye, Leland
 
"Homo profanus": Giorgio Agamben's Profane Philosophy.
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation de la Durantaye, Leland. 2008. "Homo profanus": Giorgio
Agamben's profane philosophy. Boundary 2 35(3): 27-62.
Published Version doi:10.1215/01903659-2008-011
Accessed February 17, 2015 8:58:56 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3172833
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAHomo profanus: Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy
Leland de la Durantaye
  Giorgio Agamben’s work first achieved international recognition—
and notoriety—through his study of the sacred in Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (first published in 1995, and translated into English in 
1998). This recognition and notoriety grew with the subsequent installments 
in this still ongoing series, Remnants of Auschwitz (Homo Sacer III), State 
of Exception (Homo Sacer II.1), and The Kingdom and the Glory (Homo 
Sacer II.2).  Agamben’s recent work Profanations is, however, not a part of 
that series. As its title indicates, it turns from the sacred to the profane, and 
in so doing reveals the most profound intentions of Agamben’s philosophy.
  Agamben’s naming the profane rather than the sacred in the title of 
this work does not, for as much, represent a turn to a new topic. Beginning 
Where available, I provide both the reference for the English translation as well as the 
original. The first page number will refer to the English; the second will refer to the origi-
nal. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
1. These volumes were published anachronistically, with Homo Sacer III appearing in 
1998 (translated in 2002), Homo Sacer II.1 in 2002 (translated 2003), and Homo Sacer II.2 
in 2007 (untranslated). The English translation of State of Exception does not note the 
work’s subtitle (Homo Sacer II.1).
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with his first books in the 1970s, he has shown himself profoundly interested 
in the idea of the profane, in significant part through terms and concepts 
employed by Walter Benjamin such as “profane illumination” and “the order 
of the profane.” In his Homo Sacer project, this idea of the profane has fol-
lowed Agamben’s studies of the sacred like a shadow. With this new work, 
however, it has moved to the center of his reflections and in so doing offers 
his reader a glimpse of hitherto unseen elements in his personal trajectory, 
his philosophical vocation, and his political project. The works in the Homo 
Sacer series have compellingly and persuasively argued that the creating 
of sacred and sovereign states of exception has often been responsible for 
the dire states of political affairs we find ourselves in. Profanations seeks to 
offer a solution.
  The central chapter of Profanations is programmatically entitled “In 
Praise of Profanation [Elogio della profanazione].” Its point of departure, 
like that of Homo Sacer, is both juridical and historical. “Roman jurists knew 
perfectly well what it meant ‘to profane,’” he begins.  The homo sacer that 
gave the series its name was a juridical figure from ancient Rome. Homo 
sacer designated an individual in archaic Roman law who, in response to 
a grave trespass, was cast out of the city-state. From the moment of his 
pronouncement as a homo sacer, he could be killed with complete impunity 
but not employed in sacrificial rituals that required the taking of a life. This 
“sacred man” was thus isolated from the continuum of social activity and 
communal legislation. The only law that could be said to apply to him was 
the one that irrevocably cast him out of the communal sphere. After noting 
in the first volume of the series that “the protagonist of this book is bare 
life,” Agamben offered a gloss of what he meant: “that is, the life of homo 
sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and whose 
essential function [funzione] in modern politics we intend to assert.”  As 
his readers learned over the course of the books to come, this “essential 
function” is, for modern politics, an ominous one. 
2. Giorgio Agamben, Profanazioni (Roma: Nottetempo, 2005), 83. Hereafter, this work is 
cited parenthetically as Profanazioni.
3. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8. Homo Sacer: Il potere sov-
rano e la nuda vita (Torino: Einaudi, 1995), 11–12; Agamben’s emphasis. Hereafter, this 
work is cited parenthetically as HS.
4. Though it was in this book and those to follow that this figure was principally studied, 
Agamben had, in fact, long been interested in this homo sacer. After analyzing the logic 
of sacralization, whereby an object is removed from the profane realm and raised to the 
sacred, Agamben evokes at the end of his Language and Death (1982) the figure of the de la Durantaye  /  Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy  29
  Turning to the profane, while Roman jurists may have been clear as 
to what it meant to profane, it is Agamben’s contention that we have lost a 
sense for it and thereby opened ourselves to terrible dangers. As early as 
Language and Death, Agamben had stressed, “the sacred is necessarily 
an ambiguous and circular notion,” and in the works to come he graphi-
cally illustrated this idea.  In his more recent work he has found that the 
profane also contains ambiguities and circularities in need of clarification. 
“Sacred or religious,” writes Agamben in Profanations, “are those things 
that belonged in one fashion or another to the gods” (Profanazioni, 83). For 
this reason, “they were removed from the free usage [al libero uso] and 
commerce of mankind, and could not be sold, given as deposit, or ceded 
in usufruct” (Profanazioni, 83). The idea of “sacrilege” stemmed from this 
circumscription and consisted in its violation. For Agamben, profanation 
is, however, best understood in relation to another term: consecration. “If 
consecration was the term that denoted the leaving of the sphere of human 
law, profanation signified returning something to the free usage of man-
kind” (Profanazioni, 83). To profane was thus to return the things that had 
become subject to a state of sacred exception—things that had been con-
secrated—to their original context.
homo sacer along with the juridical definition of his status. See Giorgio Agamben, Lan-
guage and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus and Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 105, translation modified. 
Il linguaggio e la morte: un seminario sul luogo della negatività (Torino: Einaudi, 1982), 
131–32.
  Eight years later, the last chapter of The Coming Community comes closer to Homo 
Sacer in its raising of the question of the paradoxical status of the Roman conception of 
sacer. See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis 
and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 86–87. La comunità che viene, Nuova 
edizione accresciuta (1990; repr., Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2001), 68–69. Hereafter, this 
work is cited parenthetically as CC. With Homo Sacer, this question had moved to the 
center of Agamben’s interests—crystallized in a single, fragile figure. Agamben told inter-
viewers in 2001, “I was always fascinated by the Latin formula that describes the homo 
sacer” (“Das unheilige Leben: Ein Gespräch mit dem italienischen Philosophen Giorgio 
Agamben,” interview with Hannah Leitgeb and Cornelia Vismann, Literaturen [Berlin] 2, 
no. 1 [January 2001]: 17). Elaborating on this fascination, he remarked, “I found this defi-
nition many, many years ago and for long years since always carried it around with me 
like a package, like a riddle [ein Rätsel], until I finally thought, now I must finally grasp 
[begreifen] it” (“Das unheilige Leben,” 17). Homo Sacer and the works to follow chronicle 
Agamben’s attempt to grasp this figure and relate it to events ancient and modern—lead-
ing him from Roman jurisprudence to German extermination camps, to the history of the 
state of exception that he sees characterizing our contemporary political landscape.
5. Agamben, Language and Death, 105/131–32.30  boundary 2  /  Fall 2008
  From the above we can easily see that Agamben’s conception of the 
relation of sacred to profane is a desacralized one. In his account, there is 
nothing inherently sacred in sacred things, just as there is nothing inherently 
contaminated in profane ones. They are, for him, categories like others, but-
tressed by those in whose interest it was to have and hold fast to such dis-
tinctions. For Agamben, to profane something is thus in no sense to debase 
its nature or reduce its value. It is, instead, a positive act for the simple rea-
son that it liberates things and practices for communal usage. Agamben will 
thus write that “pure, profane, and liberated from sacred names [dai nomi 
sacri] is the thing returned to the common use of mankind” (Profanazioni, 
83). This chain of adjectives—“pure, profane, free”—shows the intent of 
profanation and the reason Agamben wishes to praise it. Its goal is to free 
things from the “sacred names” that set them apart as the province of the 
few; it is to return the things of the world to their natural context: “common 
usage.”
  Given this view, the return of the things of the world to their original 
context, where they would be subject to a “free usage,” seems like a natural 
movement, but how one is to envision this transition is another matter. In 
Means without End, Agamben declared “. . . that which demands reflec-
tion is the possibility and the modalities of a free usage [uso libero].”  In 
an interview with the French magazine Vacarme, he offered an illustration 
of what he envisioned under the sign of such a free usage, discussing the 
debate that sprang up between the church and the Franciscan order about 
a “free usage” of the things of the world. Not only did the Franciscans reject 
the idea that they possessed personal property, they also refused to accept 
communal property (in the name of the order). The church suggested that 
they classify their manner of living as “droit d’usage” (usufructus, as distin-
guished from the right of ownership). Agamben relates that the Franciscan 
order retorted (in his own paraphrase), “Non, ce n’est pas un droit d’usage, 
c’est de l’usage sans droit [No, not a rightful usage, but usage without 
right].”  This makes clear that the “free usage” in question is not simply 
one with a more ample or liberal legal definition, but one that categori-
cally rejects the idea of legitimate ownership. This “lawless usage” is not 
6. Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 117. Mezzi senza 
fine: Note sulla politica (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1996), 93, translation modified; Agam-
ben’s emphasis. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as MWE.
7. “Une biopolitique mineure: un entretien avec Giorgio Agamben,” Vacarme (Paris), 10 
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a purely anarchic usage, but it is one that rejects the paradigms offered by 
the juridical culture of its day and carried the revolutionary implication that 
“lawful usage,” as then understood by church and state, was far from just. 
It should come as no surprise that Agamben returns to the idea of a free 
usage called for by the Franciscans, and that John XXII responded to with 
such vehemence, in Profanations (see Profanazioni, 94–96). The idea of a 
“lawless usage” or a “usage without right” corresponds to a “free usage” 
to which the things of the world—and above all those things and practices 
that have been consecrated by a sacred few—be “returned” to their original 
context. “Free usage” is thus communal and even communist usage, but it 
is also more than this, and its understanding implies a new conception of 
the categories of law and usage.
  Here Agamben’s reader is confronted with the difficult question of 
how to reconceive these categories and how to devise ways and means 
of profaning things such that they may return to the sphere of “common 
usage.” A first indication of how he envisions this is to be found in the 
thought of a figure whose importance for Agamben is without equal: Walter 
Benjamin. In “The Critique of Violence,” Benjamin makes a suggestion that 
appears quite casual. “It might be worthwhile,” he speculates, “to investi-
gate the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of life.”  From its title to its 
final lines, from Language and Death to Homo Sacer to The Kingdom and 
the Glory, it is precisely this “dogma of the sacredness of life” that Agam-
ben follows into the most remote corners of Western intellectual history. 
Agamben’s investigation of the idea of “the sacredness of life” is not singu-
lar, but what he pairs with it is: an investigation of the idea of the profane-
ness of life. In a series of books and essays culminating in Profanations, he 
has shown that investigating the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of 
life has as its corollary exploring the idea of the profaneness of life. As he 
made clear as early as Language and Death, Agamben sees the sacred 
as separated from the profane by nothing other than the rituals that set it 
outside of the continuum of everyday life, thus creating and cordoning off a 
sacred space and sacred powers to be wielded by the few over the many. In 
Homo Sacer, Agamben claims that for societies like classical Greece, “life 
became sacred only through a series of rituals whose aim was precisely 
to separate life from its profane context”—and here too suggests that this 
8. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Herman Schwep-
penhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974–1989), 2:155. Hereafter, this work 
is cited parenthetically as Benjamin GS. Cited in HS, 66/75.32  boundary 2  /  Fall 2008
“profane context” was its original one (HS, 66/76). Agamben’s intention in 
Profanations is to reverse this process. Just as Benjamin helped Agamben 
study “the dogma of the sacredness of life,” he also helped him concep-
tualize what Benjamin had called, in one of his most famous and cryptic 
fragments, “the profane order.” So as better to understand Agamben’s Pro-
fanations, it is to this fragment that we must now turn.
The Profane Order
  After acknowledging the transience of “worldly existence” in his early 
“Theologico-Political Fragment,”  Benjamin introduces a decisive term into 
this constellation: the profane. The English translation of the text leaves this 
passage extremely difficult to understand as it reads: “The secular order 
should be erected on the idea of happiness” (Benjamin SW, 3:305; my 
emphasis). This is not per se a difficult idea to envision, but it is difficult to 
align with Benjamin’s other claims in that fragment—and for good reason, 
as it is not what Benjamin writes. His declaration is both more radical and 
more coherent: “The profane order [Die Ordnung des Profanen] is to be 
erected on the idea of happiness” (Benjamin GS, 2:203; my emphasis). 
The choice made by Benjamin’s translator is at once understandable and 
unfortunate. On the one hand, Benjamin frequently discusses the idea of 
“secularization”—from the “secularization” of the idea of the messianic 
in Marx, to the more general “secularization of the theological in politics” 
diagnosed by Carl Schmitt, to the secularization of a religious “aura” in 
aesthetic experience.   The term Benjamin here employs—profane—has a 
9. The fragment in question dates, in all probability, from the early 1920s and thus from 
the beginning of Benjamin’s career. This has been a matter of some dispute, however, 
both amongst Benjamin’s friends and his editors. Gershom Scholem claims that the ideas 
expressed therein are clearly of a piece with those Benjamin was occupied with in the 
early 1920s and that the fragment clearly bears the stamp of those years. Adorno, how-
ever, gives a much different date for the fragment. He claims that Benjamin read the 
text to himself and his wife in San Remo in 1937 or 1938, describing it on that occa-
sion  as  “the  newest  of  the  new.”  Benjamin’s  German  editor  (and  Adorno’s  student), 
Rolf Tiedemann, found Scholem’s testimony compelling enough to date the fragment in 
Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften to this period. The editors of the recent English edi-
tion of Benjamin’s works, however, have found Adorno’s testimony more convincing than 
Scholem’s and have chosen to date the work to 1938 (see Walter Benjamin, Selected 
Writings, ed. Marcus Bullock, Howard Eiland, Michael W. Jennings, and Gary Smith, 
4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996–2003), 3:306n1. Hereafter, 
this work is cited parenthetically as Benjamin SW.
10. In a claim that was to carry much weight both for Benjamin and Agamben, Schmitt de la Durantaye  /  Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy  33
direct cognate in English and, as such, should have presented no problems 
of translation. Such surprising shifting of terms has a long history in trans-
lations, a long history in translations from the German, and even a relatively 
long history in translations of Benjamin’s work (de Man’s essay “Conclu-
sions: Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’” isolates several strik-
ing instances of such in the case of other translators—both English and 
French—grappling with the difficulty of Benjamin’s often baffling choice of 
terms). While such replacements initially appear to ease the reader’s task 
by offering a familiar concept (the secular) presented in familiar fashion, the 
choice prevents a full understanding of what Benjamin invokes. As noted, 
Benjamin often employed the term secular and had a clear and systematic 
understanding of the term. But he chose here to invoke not a “secular order” 
but a “profane order.” What then is this “profane order”? A “secular order” 
would be, after all, easy enough to identify: a worldly order as opposed to 
a religious one, with this operative distinction being between the religious 
and the secular. The profane is part of a still more ancient pairing—older 
than Christianity, which forged the term secular in its modern sense—and 
is one of the oldest and most deeply ingrained of cultural distinctions. It is 
paired with and opposed not to the religious but to the sacred, and once 
distinguished those allowed inside the temple (the sacred) and those kept 
from it (the profane). The “profane order,” we can then assume, is opposed 
to a “sacred order”—and indeed Benjamin’s vehement rejection of “theoc-
racy” in the fragment points precisely in this direction.
  To dismiss “theocracy” as Benjamin does in that fragment (Benjamin 
GS, 2:203) here is to abandon the idea of a sacred order beyond this world 
and thereby focus on dwelling integrally in this one: a transient world where 
things pass and fade; a world without transcendent distinctions or abso-
lute privileges. This allows us to understand something of why Agamben 
chose to title his fifth book as he did. In the same preparatory note for 
the Theses in which Benjamin evokes the “idea of prose,” he writes, “the 
messianic world is the world of complete and integral actuality [allseitiger 
und integraler Aktualität]” (Benjamin GS, 1:1239).   In an important essay 
asserted  in  his  Political  Theology  that  “all  the  decisive  concepts  of  modern  political 
theory . . . are secularized theological concepts” (Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier 
Kapiteln zu Lehre von der Souveränität [Munich: Duncker and Humboldt, 1922], 37). For 
the question of the work of art and its secularized aura, see Benjamin’s essay “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Benjamin SW.
11. This remark provides the title for Alexander García Düttmann’s introduction to the 
English translation of Idea of Prose. See Alexander García Düttmann, “Integral Actuality,” 
intro. to The Idea of Prose, trans. from the French by Kerstin Behnke, 3–25. Düttmann’s 34  boundary 2  /  Fall 2008
on Benjamin published three years before Idea of Prose, Agamben cites 
this passage, noting that in it “Benjamin expressed one of his deepest 
intentions in a radiant abbreviation [scorcio luminoso].”   In such a world of 
“complete and integral actuality,” Benjamin writes in another variant, “his-
tory is not written: it is celebrated as a festival. As a purified festival, how-
ever, it does not have the character of a ceremony and does not know any 
hymns. Its language is free prose, a prose that has broken the chains of 
writing” (Benjamin GS, 1:1235). This festivity without festival is one where 
the division between sacred and profane no longer pertains. It is without 
rite because there is nothing to divide sacred practice from profane life; 
it is a life where all illuminations would be profane ones. Such a world no 
longer waits for any transcendental consecration or culmination, and what 
it celebrates, it celebrates now. The idea of happiness Benjamin expresses 
is profane in precisely the same sense as his idea of prose, and the same 
sense as Agamben’s “coming community”: in its all-inclusiveness, in that 
it does not base its rights or its practices on a connection with a sacred or 
transcendental realm.
  Opposed to this happiness, then, is not only the pain we feel at the 
passing away of things but the established privileges of a sacred order that 
introduces divisions of power and prestige, property and special permis-
sion, into the world and has so often employed the most violent means to 
retain them. Benjamin’s “profane order” (like the “profane illumination” he 
was to see years later in certain revolutionary practices of the Surrealists) 
follows one of the conclusions of an “eternally transient” world: the rejection 
of a distinction between the sacred and the profane. If the world is truly to 
be conceived of as transient, such distinctions as a sacred order institutes 
are arbitrary ones masked as divine ordinance; they are mere ideology.
  At the end of Language and Death, it is this aspect of the sacred that 
Agamben approaches (without naming here the profane that will become 
so important, from The Coming Community to Profanations). Of sacrifice 
analysis places special emphasis on the proximity of Agamben’s views to those of not 
only Benjamin but also Adorno, as well as stressing the role of potentiality in Agamben’s 
thinking and its connection to all areas of the latter’s inquiries.
12. Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed., trans., and with 
an intro. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 49, 
translation modified. La potenza del pensiero: Saggi e conferenze (Milano: Neri Pozza, 
2005), 38. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as P. Where pages cited are from 
the later additions to the Italian text, and no published English translation exists, I will cite 
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and the sacred therein he writes in a passage Agamben found important 
enough to repeat verbatim in another essay from that same year:
However one interprets the sacrificial function, the essential thing 
is that in every case, the action [il fare] of the human community 
is grounded in another action. . . . At the center of the sacrifice is 
simply a determinate action that, as such, is separated and marked 
by exclusion; in this way it becomes sacer and is invested with a 
series of prohibitions and ritual precepts. Forbidden action, marked 
by sacredness, is not, however, simply excluded; rather it is now only 
accessible for certain people and according to determinate rules. In 
this way, it furnishes society and its ungrounded legislation with the 
fiction of a beginning: that which is excluded from the community is, 
in reality, that on which the entire life of the community is founded.  
It is precisely against this practive of sacred exclusion as the foundation 
of  community  that  Benjamin’s  “profane  order”  and  Agamben’s  coming 
community are both directed. The “ungrounded legislation” that Agamben 
evokes at the end of Language and Death becomes the target of his later 
“praise of profanation.” “To profane,” Agamben writes twenty-three years 
later, “does not simply mean to abolish or cancel separations, but to learn 
to make new uses of them” (Profanazioni, 100). The goal of profanation is 
to repeal this ungrounded legislation and to find new uses for structures 
that are to be deprived of their divisive force. “The creation of a new use,” 
Agamben writes, “is only possible through disactivating an old use—ren-
dering it inoperative [inoperoso]” (Profanazioni, 99). This new use is for this 
reason also “a pure means [un mezzo puro]”—that is to say, “a means with-
out end [un mezzo senza fine]” (Profanazioni, 99). The idea of profanation 
is in this respect closely linked to the ideas of vocation and the inopera-
tive, to decreation and potentiality, so important elsewhere in Agamben’s 
writing, as all of them are oriented toward such “new uses.” At the end of 
Language and Death, Agamben writes, “philosophy is precisely the foun-
dation of man [la fondazione dell’uomo] as human . . . and the attempt to 
absolve [assolvere] man of his ungroundedness and the unsayability of the 
sacrificial mystery.”   It is this sacrificial mystery that will be explored both 
in the Homo Sacer series and in Profanations. “Pure, profane, and liberated 
13. Agamben, Language and Death, 105/131, translation modified; Agamben’s emphasis. 
See also P, 135–36/188.
14. Agamben, Language and Death, 106/133, translation modified.36  boundary 2  /  Fall 2008
from sacred names,” as we saw, “is the thing returned to the common use 
of mankind.”
Secularization and Profanation
  There are few thinkers with whose concerns Agamben’s so often 
converge as Adorno. After the essay in Infancy and History on a pivotal 
exchange of letters between Benjamin and Adorno, the latter is only rarely 
referred to or cited in Agamben’s work—even when his reader might most 
expect it. This is most striking in the Homo Sacer series, where Agamben 
claims, “today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West” (HS, 181/202). Though Agamben does 
not mention this precedent, he was not the first student of Benjamin’s to 
see such a dark figure at the heart of our era. Before he questioned the 
status of poetry after Auschwitz, Adorno wrote in an essay composed in 
1939 and 1940, as reports concerning the conditions in German concen-
tration camps began to filter through to him in American exile, that our 
age was the “age of the concentration camp [Zeitalter der Konzentrations-
lager].”   However, it is one thing to say in the midst of World War II that 
our age is “the age of the concentration camp,” and quite another to say, 
as does Agamben fifty years later, that it is—and not only in the sense of 
being marked by its sign but as having it as its concealed “paradigm.” Con-
sidering the fame of Adorno’s categorical imperative concerning Auschwitz 
(“that Auschwitz not happen again . . . that it not repeat itself”—see Adorno 
GS, 10:674) and his remarks on art after Auschwitz (“after Auschwitz, writ-
ing a poem is barbaric”—Adorno GS, 10:30), it is surprising that they play 
no role in the sections on categorical imperatives and art in the next install-
ment of that series, Remnants of Auschwitz.
  Another point of equally close proximity is the idea that gives its title 
to Agamben’s Profanations. Adorno wrote to Benjamin that he planned to 
15. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 20 vols., ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
with Gretel Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss, and Klaus Schultz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1973–1986), 10:1.286. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as Adorno GS. Though 
he rarely cites him, it is clear that Agamben is quite familiar with Adorno’s work. That the 
essay in question here was first published in a 1942 commemorative volume dedicated to 
the memory of Benjamin makes it all the more probable that Agamben was familiar with 
it. Asked about his relation to Adorno’s thought, Agamben limited his response to noting, 
“my relation to Adorno has taken place from the beginning under the sign of Benjamin” 
(letter to author from May 27, 2006).de la Durantaye  /  Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy  37
make himself “the advocate of theological motifs in your—and, perhaps 
I might say, my own—philosophy,” and went on to write of “saving” the-
ology through what he saw as Benjamin’s “alterations [Alterationen]” of 
theology.   Adorno also noted wherein he saw these alterations lying—in 
what he called theology’s “immigration into profanity [Einwanderung in der 
Profanität].”   This much of Adorno’s declared intention appears identical 
to Agamben’s efforts in Profanations and the studies leading up to it. Years 
later, Adorno returned to the idea of the profane and of the movement of 
theological experience and energy into its realm, writing, “nothing of theo-
logical content will remain unchanged; every one must be put to the test of 
immigrating into the secular, the profane [Nichts an theologischem Gehalt 
wird unverwandelt fortbestehen; ein jeglicher wird der Probe sich stellen 
müssen, ins Säkulare, Profane einzuwandern]” (Adorno GS, 10:608). Here 
Adorno returns to the idea of an “immigration into profanity,” with a second 
term appended: the “secular.” And it is here that we find a crucial diver-
gence between Adorno and Agamben’s praise of profanation. Whereas for 
Adorno the profane and the secular could be named in a single breath and 
as a single destination, for Agamben they are to be clearly distinguished 
from one another.
  “Profanation is something completely different [etwas völlig anderes] 
from secularization,” Agamben remarked in a recent interview.
Secularization takes something from the sacred sphere and seems 
to return it to the worldly sphere [und gibt es—scheinbar—der Sphäre 
des Weltlichen zurück]. But in this case power’s mechanisms are not 
neutralized [neutralisiert]. When theological power is transformed 
into secular power, this provides a foundation for secular power. But 
secularization never truly does away with the sacred [Säkularisier-
ung schafft das Heilige nie wirklich ab]. And it is for this reason not 
a good solution to our problem—on the contrary. We must neutralize 
this relation to the sacred and that is what profanation first makes   
possible.  
16. Theodor W. Adorno / Walter Benjamin Briefwechsel, 1928–1940, ed. Henri Lonitz 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 324, 323.
17. Theodor W. Adorno / Walter Benjamin Briefwechsel, 1928–1940, 324, 323. In that 
same letter, Adorno also writes of “making the power of theological experience anony-
mously available in profanity [die Kraft der theologischen Erfahrung anonym in der Pro-
fanität mobil zu machen]” (324, 323).
18. “Der Papst ist ein weltlicher Priester,” interview with Abu Bakr Rieger, Literaturen 
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This is the last thing but an isolated line of reflection in Agamben’s thought, 
and it is to this point that he returns in Profanations, where he writes that 
in light of the “political task” currently facing us, “we must . . . distinguish 
between secularization and profanation” (Profanazioni, 88).   “Seculariza-
tion,” he writes, “is a form of removal [rimozione] which leaves forces intact, 
which limits itself to moving them from one place to another” (Profanazioni, 
88). And for this reason Agamben claims that the political secularization of 
theological concepts “only displaces the celestial monarchy into a terres-
trial one” (Profanazioni, 88). Profanation, on the other hand, is a “neutral-
ization of that which it profanes” (Profanazioni, 88).
  Agamben’s  adoption  of  Benjamin’s  profane  order  differs  from 
Adorno’s interest in the profane most clearly, then, in how it distinguishes 
secularization from profanation. While Adorno placed the two terms next to 
one another, Agamben sharply separates them and, in so doing, clarifies 
what he sees as the function and goal of profanation. For Agamben, the 
change that secularization introduces is a superficial one: it “seems” to 
return something from the sacred to the worldly sphere, but this is mere 
appearance, and for this reason it is something “completely different” from 
profanation. For Agamben, while secularization may seem to free ideas 
and things from the sacred sphere in which they had been confined, what it 
actually does is to change the location of that closed-off area. Seculariza-
tion, in his view, ultimately conserves the divisions inhering in theological 
concepts, merely displacing their center of power. What Agamben, how-
ever, envisions under the sign of profanation is more radical: it is a revolu-
tion in our structures of thought and experience, and would correspond to 
a real change in the state of worldly affairs. In Agamben’s words, secular-
ization does not “do away with the sacred”—and it is precisely this which is 
the goal of his profanations.
Profanation and Play
  How, then, does one profane? “To profane means: to open the pos-
sibility of a special form of negligence [negligenza] that ignores the sepa-
ration—or rather, makes a particular usage of it” (Profanazioni, 85). The 
first form of this negligence that Agamben offers as paradigmatic easily 
19. In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben studies different conceptions of secular-
ization—particularly the different ways in which Schmitt and Weber use the term (see 
Il Regno e la Gloria: Per una genealogica teologica dell’economia e del governo. Homo 
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risks seeming light-handed and light-hearted, as anarchic and unserious: 
“play [il gioco].” This element in Profanations is also not a new concern 
for Agamben, as the historical evolution from rite to game, which is also 
the profanation of sacred practices, is something he systematically studied 
as early as the chapter “In Playland: Reflections on History and Play” in 
Infancy and History.   Picking up this earlier thread, Agamben observes in 
Profanations, “the majority of our games derive from ancient and sacred 
ceremonies, from rituals and divinatory practices that had belonged for a 
time to the religious sphere” (Profanazioni, 85–86). He then cites a series of 
such games: ball games “that reproduce the gods’ struggles to possess the 
sun,” and such objects as the spinning top and the chess board that were 
initially “divinatory instruments.” The conclusion that Agamben then draws 
is that “this signifies that the game liberates and diverts humanity from the 
sphere of the sacred, but without simply abolishing it” (Profanazioni, 86).
  But, as Agamben points out, recourse to games and play is not 
a simple one in our day and age—and above all because “the game as 
means of profanation has fallen into disuse [decadenza]” (Profanazioni, 
87). This does not mean that games as such have disappeared from our 
culture—on the contrary, they are more present than ever. But they do not 
play this profanizing role that Agamben saw in earlier cultures. “That mod-
ern man no longer knows how to play,” he writes, “is to be seen precisely 
in the vertiginous multiplication of old and new games” (Profanazioni, 87). 
What one finds in these new games is not a profanizing instrument or force, 
but a “desperate and obstinate” search to “return to the lost festival, a 
return to the sacred and its rites” (Profanazioni, 87). “In this sense, the 
televised games for the masses are part of a new liturgy, secularizing an 
unconsciously religious intention” (Profanazioni, 87–88). It is for this reason 
that “to return the game to its purely profane vocation [alla sua vocazione 
puramente profana] is a political task” (Profanazioni, 88).
  As we saw above, for Agamben, “profanation implies . . . a neutral-
ization of that which it profanes” (Profanazioni, 88). In his third work, Agam-
ben evoked a “negation of a negation,” and it is this idea which returns in 
a new and more precise form in Profanations.   His goal is not simply to 
20. This was a largely structuralist attempt—it is dedicated to Claude Lévi-Strauss—to 
understand the “systems” and “mechanisms” whereby rites become profaned—which is 
to say, become games—and vice versa.
21. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron 
(London and New York: Verso, 1993), 98. Infanzia e storia: Distruzione dell’esperienza e 
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negate or to nullify the sacred history of an object or practice but to remove 
it from its sacred context and return it to a profane one. For this reason, it is 
better envisioned as the division of a division or the negation of a negation. 
It still exists, and its history remains accessible, but its sacred significa-
tion is suspended; it has been rendered, to use one of Agamben’s favorite 
terms, “inoperative.”
The Messiah
  Any reader of Agamben’s works will note that he is drawn to theo-
logical figures. Amongst these, one has, as it should, clear pride of place: 
the Messiah. Agamben’s references to the Messiah, messianic time, and 
the idea of the messianic are frequent and yet have perplexed a number of 
his readers. He has written of a “messianic vocation that is the revocation 
of every vocation” found in Paul’s letters as well as of an “untitled messianic 
moment” in Cy Twombly’s painting.   In an aside made in an essay from 
1995, Agamben refers to “the classless society or the messianic kingdom 
[nella società senza classi o nel regno messianico],” effectively equating 
the two ideas (and reiterating Benjamin’s assertion from a thesis Agamben 
himself rediscovered) (MWE, 32–33/32). As for who reigns in that kingdom, 
Agamben writes in an essay from 1995, “the Messiah is the figure in which 
religion confronts the problem of the law,” and in Homo Sacer, Agamben 
tells his reader, “the Messiah is the figure in which the great monotheistic 
religions sought to master the problem of law” (MWE, 135/104, translation 
modified; HS, 56/65). The Messiah is thus “a figure” which allows us to see 
a historically decisive confrontation of religion and law. That this is the last 
thing but a historically or conceptually localized phenomenon is something 
that Agamben is at pains to stress, claiming, “in Judaism, as in Christianity 
or Shiite Islam, the Messiah’s arrival signifies the fulfillment and the com-
plete consummation of the Law” (HS, 56/65). The consequence he draws 
from this is that “in monotheism, messianism thus constitutes not simply 
one category of religious experience among others but rather the limit con-
cept of religious experience in general” (HS, 56/65).
22. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 23–24, 
translation modified. Il tempo che resta: Un commento alla Lettera ai Romani (Torino: 
Bollati Boringhieri, 2000), 29. See also Giorgio Agamben, “Bellezza che cade,” in Cy 
Twombly:  8  Sculptures,  American  Academy,  Rome,  Sept.  28–Nov.  15,  1998  (Rome: 
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  While this is a great deal to see under the heading of the messianic, 
he sees still more. Just as, for him, the state of exception is not a cate-
gory of political experience among others but, instead, marks the limit of 
political experience, messianism marks the limit of religious experience 
and the point where it gives way to questions of law. This limit is, however, 
not only one that links religion with law. In another essay, Agamben writes, 
“messianism represents the point of greatest proximity between religion 
and philosophy,” and he will echo this position in an interview, noting that 
“because philosophy is constitutively bound up in a confrontation with the 
law [un confronto con la legge], the messianic represents the point of great-
est proximity between religion and philosophy” (P, 163/255).   The figure of 
the Messiah is thus a figure standing at the crossroads of the areas demar-
cated by law, religion, and philosophy. But how are we to understand this 
figure and its role in Agamben’s thought?
  In Agamben’s reading, the great monotheistic religions sought “to 
control and reduce the essential messianic properties of religion and phi-
losophy” (P, 163/255). They could never fully succeed for the reason that 
“the messianic is precisely that element which, in religion, goes beyond 
it, exceeds and completes it at every point [la eccede e compie in ogni 
punto].”   Nevertheless, this has led not only to the consistent repression 
of messianic movements within the great monotheistic religions but also 
to a singular use made of messianism’s central feature: the real state of 
exception it calls into being. As he states in an essay from 1992, “messianic 
time has the form of a state of exception” (P, 160/252). In Homo Sacer, 
Agamben writes, “from the juridico-political perspective, messianism is . . . 
a theory of the state of exception—except for the fact that in messianism, 
there is no authority to proclaim the state of exception; instead, there is 
the Messiah to subvert [sovverte] its power” (HS, 57–58/67). The mes-
sianic state of exception Agamben enigmatically evokes here corresponds 
to what Benjamin had enigmatically called “a real state of exception,” where 
the state of exception that has become the rule is deprived of its divisive 
power. And it is for this reason that Agamben will speak of “the task that 
messianism has assigned to modern politics,” and that he defines as “to 
conceive of a human community that would have not (only) the figure of 
the law [non avesse (soltanto) la figure delle legge]” (MWE, 135–36/105, 
translation modified).
23. See also “Un libro senza patria: Giorgio Agamben intervista di Federico Ferrari,” 
Eutropia 1 (2001): 44–46, 44.
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  As these remarks make amply clear, Agamben’s recourse to the 
Messiah, the messianic, and the messianic kingdom is both crucial and 
elusive. To better understand it, let us return to the fragment which first 
revealed a “profane order.” The “Theologico-Political Fragment” we looked 
at above begins: “Only the Messiah himself completes all history [Erst 
der Messias selbst vollendet alles historische Geschehen], in the sense 
that he alone redeems, completes, creates [erlöst, vollendet, schafft] its 
relation to the messianic” (Benjamin SW, 3:305; GS 2:203). In light of 
the Jewish tradition of messianic thought, these opening lines are ortho-
dox ones and present no great interpretative difficulties. The Messiah will 
come, and when He does, His Coming will “complete” human history. For 
Christians, the Messiah (Jesus Christ) has already come—and until His 
Second Coming, He can offer redemption by coming again to the indi-
vidual hearts of mankind. In this sense, redemption through Christ occurs 
in the private world of each individual touched by grace. In the Jewish 
tradition Benjamin is clearly writing in, however, redemption through the 
Messiah is nothing of the sort. It is not an individual experience (grace) 
but a communitarian—a public and political—event that takes place, to 
borrow Scholem’s canonic definition, “on the stage of history, and within 
the [Jewish] community.”  
  Whereas the first clause in Benjamin’s fragment is straightforward, 
the second one asserts something that has divided messianic thought: 
“. . . he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the messianic.” 
Benjamin seems to say thereby that we can do nothing to influence the 
relation of human history to the Messiah, nothing to hasten or slow His 
arrival. It is the Messiah who not only “redeems” and “completes,” but also 
“alone . . . creates” the relation of the messianic to human history. How 
then does Benjamin move from this more or less orthodox conception of 
the Messiah and His coming to a “method” called “nihilism” that is “the 
task of world politics” (“. . . die Aufgabe der Weltpolitik, deren Methode 
25. See Scholem’s “Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism,” first 
given as a lecture in 1959. Scholem’s distinguishing of a Christian idea of redemption 
through the Messiah as a private and individual experience from a Jewish one, in which 
this element of “interiority” is absent, was long held as unassailable. It was first seriously 
questioned by Jacob Taubes in his lecture before the Jewish World Congress in Jeru-
salem in 1979 entitled “The Price of Messianism,” first published after Scholem’s death 
in 1982, then reprinted in Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen 
Vernunft, ed. Aleida and Jan Assmann, Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, and Winfried Menninghaus 
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Nihilismus zu heißen hat” [Benjamin GS, 2:204])? To understand this sin-
gular constellation of ideas, we must first stress that, in Benjamin’s hands, 
nihilism has no necessarily negative associations. For a thinker like Nietz-
sche, nihilism is an all-too-human consequence of “the death of God” and 
the “devaluation of all values” that follows in its wake. Such “nihilism,” how-
ever, is far from what one could call a “method” having something decisive 
to offer “world politics.” The nihilism that Benjamin has in mind, however, 
asks to be seen along the lines of a clandestine anarchism like that of 
the Russian “nihilists.” Benjamin’s conception of nihilism here is difficult to 
grasp because its valorizations are unconventional and the link between 
this most positive of presences, the Messiah, and the “method” Benjamin 
calls “nihilism” is only comprehensible through two other terms that play 
decisive roles in Benjamin’s fragment: transience and the profane.
  A  few  lines  later  Benjamin  writes,  “the  rhythm  of  this  eternally 
transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its spatial but also 
in its temporal totality, the rhythm of messianic nature, is happiness [der 
Rhythmus, dieses ewig vergehenden, in seiner Totalität vergehenden, in 
seiner räumlichen, aber auch zeitlichen Totalität vergehenden Weltlichen, 
der Rhythmus der messianischen Natur, ist Glück]” (Benjamin SW, 3:306; 
GS, 2:204). Two things are asserted here and both of them are surprising. 
Benjamin looks at the world and sees “transience”—complete and total 
“transience.” This emphasis is far from a self-evident one. Transience is, of 
course, part of our vision of the world and makes for much of the beauty 
that we experience. We are touched by its fragility, by what we see as the 
unimaginable touch of time that will soon take it from this world. For this 
reason, transience is at the heart of poetry, but less evidently at the heart of 
philosophy. One might better say that transience is opposed to philosophy, 
for if philosophy is about things that are not just temporarily and contin-
gently true but which pretend to some level of universal validity, they cannot 
be founded on the basis of things ceaselessly passing away. The eternal 
universe of the classical world and the eternal realm of pure ideas clearly 
stand in opposition to it. Plato’s project of “saving appearances” was to 
show that this transience, this continual passing away of the things of the 
world, was not the ultimate reality of human existence but, instead, only its 
imperfect reflection. Things do not really pass away, for, as Plato said in the 
Timaeus, “Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and 
when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving 
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call time.”   The seeming transience of this world is redeemed by the real 
eternity of another.
  In the Christian redemption of the transitory, this eternity is given a 
single divine face, and it is the loving and watchful eye of God whose grace 
transforms the transient into the lasting and the desultory into the mean-
ingful. In the Gospels of both Matthew and Luke, we hear this vigilance 
extended even to the most insignificant elements of our worldly existence 
and mortal person, and we are told that even “the very hairs of your head 
are all numbered.”   In a world in which everything seems to pass away, 
where all is consigned to ruin and loss, there is a principle that retrieves 
and retains everything, where nothing is lost, where, as Gerard Manley 
Hopkins taking up the evangelical lesson wrote, “Every hair is hair of the 
head / Numbered.” In both classical and Christian conceptions, there is 
another world or place—a timeless one—that transcends this time and 
this place. In asserting that this world is “eternally transient [ewig verge-
hend]”—both in space and in time—Benjamin is categorically rejecting this 
millennial philosophico-theological heritage.
  Benjamin then draws two conclusions from the “eternal transience” 
he sees: that this transience corresponds to “messianic nature,” and that 
it is “happiness.” The “rhythm” this transience follows or forms is not one 
of loss or despair, not one of nausea or the gnashing of teeth, and not one 
calling for elegies or laments at the sight of a world forever disappearing 
into nothingness. This “rhythm” that Benjamin says is that of “messianic 
nature” is simply and completely “happiness.” Benjamin is not dismissing 
the fact that nothing in life is so difficult to accept as that it will end. To 
accept that not only we ourselves but all the beautiful things that we experi-
ence—all the people, places, and things that we love—are destined to pass 
and fade into nothingness (“nihilism,” in the singular turn Benjamin gives to 
the term) is supremely difficult. What is more, our mortal sense of justice 
demands that the world not be a nihilistic one—that there be a positive 
principle of judgment and retribution for all the cruel acts we see committed 
around us. We ask that the just be rewarded and unjust punished. And our 
mortal sense of beauty (or grace) demands that these passing things have 
some durable reality. It is not singular or strange to look at the world and 
26. Timaeus 37d. in Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, ed. 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 71 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1961), 1167.
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see, as did Benjamin, transience. And it is not singular or strange to claim 
that this is all there is to the world. But for all the reasons noted above, it 
is singular and strange to find in this fact the source of “happiness.” On 
the contrary, were we not to expect in its stead melancholy and despair? It 
is for this reason that, in the fantastically compressed logic of Benjamin’s 
fragment, he refers to a “messianic intensity of the heart” that consigns it 
to “unhappiness [Unglück] in the sense of suffering” (Benjamin SW, 3:305; 
GS, 2:204, translation modified).   The extraordinary nature of Benjamin’s 
conception lies in his effort to find and found happiness not in a transcen-
dent realm lying elsewhere, but here and now in this and only this world, in 
this and only this life.
  That  Agamben  is  perfectly  aware  of  this  element  in  Benjamin’s 
thought and that it is an important one for him is attested to in his The Time 
That Remains, where he contrasts Benjamin’s vision of transience with 
Paul’s: “While, for Paul, creation is unwillingly subjected to transience [cadu-
cità] and destruction and for this reason groans and suffers while awaiting 
redemption, for Benjamin, who reverses this in an ingenious way, nature is 
messianic precisely because of its eternal and complete transience, and 
the rhythm of this messianic transience is happiness itself.”   Nihilism for 
Benjamin is thus not opposed to some form of positivism and not aligned 
with meaninglessness. It is instead the radical and difficult acceptance of 
the transience of this world, and what it denies is that our happiness and 
our political tasks should be shaped by a transcendental realm seen in 
sacred glimpses by privileged individuals. In the face of worldly transience, 
the best “method,” the best path to follow, is one that follows an endless 
route toward some transcendental plane or place, but one focused fully on 
this time and this place.
  To link the idea of transience with that of the messianic is, for both 
Benjamin and Agamben, to grasp what the former called a “messianic 
freezing of events” through a “concept of the present as ‘now-time’ [‘Jetzt-
zeit’] . . . loaded with splinters of the messianic [Splitter der messiani-
schen]” (Benjamin GS, 1:704). This vision of messianic time is thus one 
that is clearly not concerned with waiting for some state of affairs to come 
about, or with reaching some point located in the future, but is, instead, 
focused on how we experience our historical present. That this aspect of 
28. The translation of Unglück as “misfortune” obscures Benjamin’s clear opposition of 
Unglück (unhappiness) and Glück (happiness) in the passage.
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Benjamin’s thought is central to Agamben can be seen in his claim that 
“the concept of messianic time . . . constitutes the theoretical nucleus of 
Benjamin’s ‘Theses’” (P, 160/252).   And it is on this same point that Agam-
ben distances himself from many thinkers whose projects might seem at 
first glance to be so similar to his own. Agamben has remarked that what 
separates his own thought from Derrida’s is “an important difference” in the 
manner of “confronting the same problem,” and he gives that problem the 
name “messianic time.”   In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben refers to 
Derrida’s “idea of an infinite deferral,” and, as with the “infinite negotiations” 
he spoke of in the precursor to that book, Homo Sacer, herein lies, for him, 
the problem with Derrida’s thought.   As Agamben argued in his Infancy 
and History, the revolutionary conception of history introduced by Marx was 
not accompanied by a revolutionary conception of time, and it is this theo-
retical lacuna that he aspires to fill. Derrida’s thought clearly contains much 
for Agamben that is revolutionary in its conception of language and in its 
conception of history—but not in its conception of the time in which they 
take place. The “important difference” Agamben refers to in the interview 
above is that of time—and, for him, it makes all the difference.  
  To many, the idea of “messianic time” might suggest indeterminate 
waiting for the Messiah to come, redeem mankind, and complete human 
history. But for Agamben, drawing on conceptions of messianic time in 
30. Agamben stresses how Paul, too, spoke of a “time of the now” virtually equivalent to 
Benjamin’s “now-time” and how “Benjamin’s messianism finds its canon [il suo canone] 
in Paul” (The Time That Remains, 144/133).
31. “Un libro senza patria,” 44.
32. Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (Homo 
Sacer III), trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone, 2002), 123. Quel che resta di 
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See also HS, 54/62–63.
33. Adam Thurschwell follows Agamben’s critique of deconstruction back to Language 
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Mills, “Agamben’s Messianic Politics: Biopolitics, Abandonment and Happy Life,” Contre-
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Benjamin and in Paul, it means just the opposite. “Messianic time,” the 
term that came to replace the “cairology” Agamben wrote of in Infancy 
and History, is like that earlier term in that it rejects a historical dialectic of 
progress and its logic of deferral; it rejects the positing of the completion of 
a historical task in an indeterminate future. “The sole possibility we have 
to truly grasp the present,” Agamben has remarked, “is to conceive of it as 
the end [sie als das Ende zu denken]. That was Benjamin’s idea and his 
messianism is above all to be understood after this fashion. The paradigm 
for the understanding of the present is messianic time.”   In Infancy and 
History, Agamben wrote that the “cairology” he described was one that 
should be sought not at the millennium but, instead, “now.” This is a time 
in which individuals and communities can seize what Agamben has called 
the kairos of every historical moment: the call to thought and action of the 
alarm clock Benjamin heard ringing “sixty seconds every minute.”
  What is at once messianic and profane for both Benjamin and Agam-
ben is a world no longer bound by consecrated divisions and distinctions, 
and where the things of the world are returned to “the common usage of 
mankind.” The “profane order” is given this name because it is one in which 
the sacred as source of criteria for exclusion and exception has no place. 
In The Coming Community, the messianic kingdom served as a paradigm 
because it had neither an inclusive or exclusive identity and in this most fun-
damental sense corresponds to “The Idea of Communism” Agamben had 
sketched in Idea of Prose.   The divisions that separate groups and indi-
viduals need not be annihilated or forgotten, but they need to be rendered 
inoperative and thereby deprived of their power to divide. For this reason 
Agamben will write of an “untitled messianic moment in which art stays 
miraculously still, almost astounded: fallen and risen in every instant [ad 
ogni istante caduta e risorta].”   Agamben says “fallen and risen” because 
in the light cast by a profane world there is no operative distinction between 
the two. Every creature and every gesture in such an integrally profane and 
integrally actual world is equally and at every moment “fallen and risen.”
  While this clarifies the relation of the profane to the sacred and the 
meaning of a profane order in relation to the categories of nihilism and 
transience, we are left with the figure that Benjamin begins his reflection 
34. “Das unheilige Leben,” 18.
35. Giorgio Agamben, Idea of Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995). Idea della prosa: Nuova edizione illuminata e 
accresciuta (1985; repr., Macerata: Quodlibet, 2002).
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with and to which Agamben so often returns: the Messiah. What place, if 
any, does the Messiah have in such a profane order? Would He not belong 
to the realm of the sacred? Are we to wait first for His coming to actualize 
such an integral vision of a transient world? The answer to the last question 
is: clearly not. For Benjamin, it is a false messianism that sees “the Divine 
Kingdom . . . as the telos of a historical dynamic [das Telos der historischen 
Dynamis].” Such a kingdom is, for him, “not the goal [Ziel], but instead the 
end [Ende]” of history (Benjamin GS, 2:203–4). Nihilism is the “task” of 
world politics because it is to see the world as nothing more than it is, to 
not construct world politics on the basis of a sacred order that is one day to 
come into being (a false messianism), but instead on a profane order that 
is already right before our eyes and is the only world we have ever known. 
In no way does he exclude the idea of a divine order beyond this one. What 
he does wish to isolate are the dangers of the idea of a sacred order. And 
it is for this reason that he begins by evoking the decisive figure in that 
order: the Messiah. A connection to the Messiah, Benjamin claims, is not 
to be created from this side, from the transient and profane world that is our 
own—whether it take up the mantle of the sacred or not. If there is a Mes-
siah, and if he is coming, is something we cannot know. It is a “relation” that 
can be made, in Benjamin’s view, only from the other side—by the Messiah. 
In the meantime, we have only this world and this life. And we have no time 
to waste.
How to Bring About the Coming of the Messiah
  The preceding allows us to better understand the recourse made by 
both Benjamin and Agamben to the messianic and the Messiah, but the 
question remains whether they might not have expressed their thoughts 
with equal clarity without recourse to this Messiah who, for all intents and 
purposes of this “profane order,” may never come. In another text—one 
that interests Agamben in The Coming Community—Benjamin recounts 
the most decisive thing in the world: how to bring about the coming of the 
Messiah. The thirteenth chapter of The Coming Community begins: “There 
is a well-known parable about the Kingdom of the Messiah that Walter 
Benjamin (who heard it from Gershom Scholem) recounted one evening to 
Ernst Bloch, who in turn transcribed it in Spuren.”   Bloch writes, “A rabbi, 
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a real cabalist, once said that in order to establish the reign of peace it is 
not necessary to destroy everything nor to begin a completely new world. 
It is sufficient to displace this cup or this brush or this stone just a little, and 
thereby everything. But this small displacement is so difficult to achieve and 
its measure is so difficult to find that, with regard to the world, humans are 
incapable of it and it is necessary that the Messiah come” (quoted in CC, 
53/45, translation modified). The parable that passed through the hands of 
Scholem and Benjamin and that Bloch here recounts concerns the most 
divisive question in Jewish messianic thought: what, if anything, can we 
do to hasten the arrival of the Messiah? Many have held that the Messiah 
was waiting for certain worldly criteria to be fulfilled. This criterion or these 
criteria fulfilled, the Messiah would come, “complete” human efforts, and 
close human history. What exactly this thing was—the coming of a truly just 
man, the forming of a truly just community, the reaching of a certain global 
state of affairs such as peace on earth or a return to the Holy Land—was 
a matter of the greatest uncertainty and contention, but all members of this 
school of thought shared the idea that mankind needed to discern and do 
some thing or things to bring about the coming of the Messiah.
  This was not, however, a premise adopted by all thinkers in the mes-
sianic tradition. Another school of thought saw the coming of the Messiah 
as determined in advance and independent from human actions and thus 
from the fulfilling of any worldly criteria. The Messiah would come when He 
was destined to come, and there was nothing we could do to hasten or slow 
His arrival. Whatever the current state of the world, whatever its degree 
of justice or injustice at that moment, He would come. In the former case, 
everything depended on finding out how to fulfill the seemingly unknowable 
criteria. In the latter case, nothing could be done to slow or hasten His 
arrival, and one had only to wait.
  When considered in the context of these two currents of messianic 
thought, the parable Bloch recounts offers a radical reformulation of the 
problem. Though there is indeed something we must do in order for the 
Messiah to come, this is something neither great nor grand—nothing to 
do with social justice (a just community) or political hegemony (a return to 
the Holy Land)—but instead is something so subtle and small, if perhaps 
ineffably genuine, so as to seem to our eyes perfectly insignificant. Here, 
however, is where the contours of the parable begin to blur. How can we 
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discern which stone or which cup to displace—and how far? Because this 
“small displacement” is so tiny, we will never find it (we are “incapable of 
it,” says Bloch), and for this reason we need the Messiah to come—of His 
own calling. With this idea of the “small displacement,” Bloch brings the two 
schools of messianic thought into the greatest possible proximity. There is 
in fact something to do that will hasten the coming of the Messiah, but it is 
so minor that we can never know it and have only to act as if the Messiah 
were not waiting for some mortal action.
  As Agamben reminds his reader in The Coming Community, Bloch 
was told the parable—or something approximating it—by Benjamin. And he 
is not the only one to have committed a version of it to paper. In the version 
of the parable that Benjamin recounts, things stand a tiny, but decisive, bit 
differently. He writes, “The Hassidim tell a story about the world to come 
that says everything there will be just as it is here. Just as our room is now, 
so it will be in the world to come; where our baby sleeps now, there too 
will it sleep in the other world. And the clothes we wear in this world, those 
too we will wear there. Everything will be as it is now, just a little different” 
(Benjamin GS, 2:432).  
  It seems that Benjamin’s vision of the messianic kingdom is more 
radical—and more perplexing—than Bloch’s. In Bloch’s telling, the mes-
sianic kingdom and this world are astonishingly close, but nonetheless 
separate. The tiny displacement in Benjamin’s version focuses instead on 
something absolutely different. The emphasis is no longer on what we must 
do to bring about the coming of the Messiah, but on what the world will be 
like after He has come. And, surprisingly enough, this event seems almost 
superfluous. The messianic world is indeed not this world, and yet nothing 
will be changed in it. “Everything,” says Benjamin, “will be as it is now”—all 
things will remain in their places, and the various vocations of men and 
women will remain the same—or almost. “Everything will be as it is now,” 
says Benjamin, “just a little different.” Everything then lies in understanding 
this difference.
  The Messiah is the anointed one come to transform the world and to 
mark a fundamental change in all its distinctions: the messianic kingdom. 
But what happens in this messianic kingdom? Paul seems to say some-
thing akin to Benjamin’s parable in the First Letter to the Corinthians, where 
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he notes that, in the time of the end, we will remain in our places—men 
will remain men and women, women, rich and poor will remain rich and 
poor, it is only that these distinctions will cease to divide them as they had 
in the past; we would not change in our worldly callings, but our relation 
to the categories, qualities, possessions, and properties that had hitherto 
defined us would.   Circumcised will remain circumcised, uncircumcised 
will remain uncircumcised, but circumcision will become, in Paul’s words, 
“nothing” (1 Cor. 7:19)—that is, nothing that need divide us. But how are 
we to envision such a messianic kingdom where everything remains the 
same—except for a small difference?
Hope, or, The Irreparable
  Another way of posing this question is: if everything is to be the same, 
where does this leave the figure of the Messiah and the hope assigned to 
His coming? Rolf Tiedemann has claimed that Benjamin was “not referring 
to that Messiah . . . which religions promise.”   If Benjamin’s editor and 
critic is right, the question remains as to what Messiah he is referring to. In 
the Jewish tradition, the Messiah is the divine figure of worldly hope. What, 
then, is the role of hope in Benjamin and Agamben’s “time of the now”?
  In the final words of Benjamin’s study of Goethe’s Elective Affinities, 
he writes, “only for the sake of the hopeless are we given hope [Nur um 
der Hoffnungslosen willen ist uns die Hoffnung gegeben]” (Benjamin GS, 
1:201). His remarks evoke one of the most famous modern statements on 
hope and hopelessness—and one that Benjamin found of particular inter-
est. One evening, Max Brod summarized his friend’s position as that there 
was simply no hope. Kafka immediately corrected him: “Oh no, there is 
indeed hope, hope enough, unending hope—only not for us” (see Benjamin 
GS, 2:414). Given Kafka’s and Benjamin’s remarks on the matter, it should 
come as no surprise that this elusive hope was one that Adorno would 
attempt to come to grips with. In a section bearing the heading “Finale,” 
at the end of his Minima Moralia, Adorno writes, “the only philosophy that 
can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to con-
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template all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint 
of redemption.” To this end, “perspectives must be fashioned that displace 
and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indi-
gent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light.” In the 
haunting final words of the fragment, he writes, “beside the demand thus 
placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption 
itself hardly matters.”   This imperative is felt so strongly by Adorno that 
the question of actual redemption—redemption through the coming of the 
Messiah—appears of secondary importance. The thinker to whom Agam-
ben’s The Time That Remains is dedicated, Jacob Taubes, was to excoriate 
this view—and this passage—as “the aesthete’s variant” on the idea of the 
messianic. In Adorno, says Taubes, “it hardly matters whether [redemption] 
is real. In Benjamin, it does matter.”   Whether Taubes’s criticism is founded 
or not, it clearly formulates the question of how “actual redemption” is to be 
viewed—and awaited.
  In The Coming Community, this topic is approached through the 
curious term irreparable. Agamben says of the figures one finds in the 
fiction of the idiosyncratic Robert Walser—a favorite of both Kafka and 
Benjamin—that they are “irreparably astray” (CC, 6/14).   Both the tenth 
chapter and the appendix to Agamben’s work bear this same term—irre-
parable—as their title. The first of these, the chapter entitled “Irreparable,” 
evokes “the post iudicium world” (CC, 40/38). From it, suggests Agamben, 
“both necessity and contingency, those two crosses of Western thought, 
have disappeared,” with the result that “the world is now and forever nec-
essarily contingent or contingently necessary” (CC, 40/38). This idea of 
making the necessary indistinguishable from the contingent is perfectly in 
line with Benjamin’s idea of a “profane order.” It is only on the basis of a 
transcendental and sacred realm beyond this world that such a dividing line 
could be drawn. A truly profane world—one that was truly conceived of as 
transient and thereby as “integral actuality”—would have no place for such. 
Agamben’s irreparable is linked to a special form of irreverence so singu-
41.  Theodor  Wiesengrund  Adorno,  Minima  Moralia:  Reflections  from  Damaged  Life, 
trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: NLB, 1974), 247. Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem 
beschädigten Leben (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 333–34.
42. Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 75.
43. Agamben also refers to Walser in Profanations (see Profanazioni, 14). For more 
on Walser and Agamben’s relation to him, see Jan Plug, “Shame, On the Language of 
Robert Walser,” MLN 120, no. 3 (April 2005): 654–84.de la Durantaye  /  Giorgio Agamben’s Profane Philosophy  53
larly rendered in Walser’s characters, who, having accepted the irreparable 
state of worldly affairs, lose their reverence for what are held up as sacred 
truths. And yet what role does the Messiah play here? Why is this called a 
“post iudicium world,” and why is that world not a transformed one? Taubes 
attacked Adorno for what he saw as an “aestheticization of the messianic.” 
Adorno’s messianism was ultimately empty because it claimed that it was a 
matter of no importance whether the Messiah came—or, to state the matter 
differently, because it employed redemption and the Messiah as paradigms 
that made their actuality of secondary importance, or, perhaps, of no impor-
tance at all. In this light, is Agamben not open to the same criticism?
  In the appendix to The Coming Community, which also bears the title 
“Irreparable,” Agamben writes, “how the world is—this is outside the world” 
(CC, 106/88). At its outset, Agamben informs his reader that this appendix 
“can be read as a commentary on section 9 of Martin Heidegger’s Being 
and Time and proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” adding, 
“both texts deal with the attempt to define an old problem of metaphysics: 
the relationship between essence and existence” (CC, 89/72). As Agam-
ben does not cite Wittgenstein’s proposition, it bears noting here: “What is 
mystical is not how the world is, but that it is [Nicht ‘wie’ die Welt ist, ist das 
Mystische, sondern ‘daß’ sie ist].” One thing that Wittgenstein is saying is 
that the sheer fact that the world exists is so wonderful and strange that 
mystical is not a bad word to describe it—and that what is far more “mys-
tical” than any given rationally inexplicable event in the world is the world 
itself. Saying “how the world is—this is outside the world” is Agamben’s 
way of saying what Wittgenstein (and Heidegger) said before him. Because 
there is no transcendental perspective from which to see the world in its 
totality, and from that point to judge it, one cannot say “how the world,” in 
its totality, is. And, ultimately, making a distinction between existence and 
essence, between the necessary and the contingent, would require pre-
cisely that. Recognizing that “how the world is,” is something that could 
be said only from “outside the world” is a precondition for living in a world 
where existence and essence, necessity and contingency, are inseparable, 
because there is no transcendental instance or sacred exception that can 
draw the line between the two from within this life and this world. It is for 
this reason that in the chapter entitled “Irreparable” Agamben will invoke a 
“post iudicium” world, not because the Messiah has come and gone, not 
because judgment has already been passed, but because we have every 
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conceiving this is as living in a world where judgment of this sort belongs 
only to the past.
  Agamben’s readers, as did Adorno’s, often fail to distinguish between 
a harsh indictment and the relinquishing of hope. In this same “Finale” to 
his Minima Moralia, Adorno writes of a remove from the world from which to 
view it as an “utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint 
removed, even if by a hair’s breadth, from the magic circle of existence, 
whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only be first 
wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very 
reason, by the same distortion and indigence it seeks to escape.”   This 
“distortion and indigence” that so darkens Adorno’s world is not one that 
Agamben wishes to turn away from. But the idea of this world as lacking 
something, as needing some addition from elsewhere, is one he rejects 
(and for which his study of “the original structure of negativity” in Language 
and Death laid the groundwork). For this reason, in this second section 
of  his  work  named  “Irreparable,”  Agamben  is  fundamentally concerned 
with what he calls the “salvation of the profanity of the world [profanità del 
mondo],” and which he concisely defines as “its being thus [il suo esser-
cosi]” (CC, 89/73). The idea of the salvation of the profanity of the world is 
an idea that is difficult to grasp—particularly as it is not conceived of as a 
sanctification of the profane, but as a salvation that takes place through its 
being and remaining “thus”—or, in the words with which Agamben began 
The Coming Community, “whatever.” Agamben goes on to say, “the root of 
all pure joy and sadness is that the world is as it is,” and it is here that we 
can best understand his idea of the irreparable and the importance of the 
idea of the profane—an idea which will guide his reflections to the present 
day and his recent book, Profanations (CC, 90/74). To say that the world is 
“irreparable” is, of course, not to say that nothing is to be done, that nothing 
in the world is to be bettered and that no imperative like the one formulated 
by Adorno is called for. The term is meant not in the conventional sense 
of something that one would like to repair or remedy but cannot. Just as 
Agamben does not try to wish transience away, neither does he try to repair 
the irreparable. On the contrary, accepting that the world is irreparable, in 
this sense that it is a transient and profane one, is the necessary precondi-
tion for bettering situations most in need of our attention and action.
  The post iudicium kingdom that Agamben conceives of is thus not 
one where the temples are destroyed, or where all are crammed into them, 
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but where the distinctions that separate sacred and profane are rendered, 
to choose one of Agamben’s preferred words, inoperative. And this would 
show the way, then, for a coming community founded not on an inclusive 
logic of belonging (being communist, Italian, or the like), whose conse-
quence has always been exclusion and violence, but as founded on a con-
ception of our world as integrally and “irreparably” “profane.” One of the 
fragments in this same “Irreparable” appendix to The Coming Commu-
nity reads, “The world—insofar as it is absolutely, irreparably profane—is 
God” (CC, 89/74). To experience the world as “irreparable” (transient in its 
passing and unchangeable in its past) and “profane” by no means requires 
that one deny the existence of God or remove God from the world. One 
might just as well equate every atom and instant of the world with such a 
Divinity.  
An Absolutely Profane Life
  In an essay from 1992, Agamben refers to a “political philosophy” 
worthy of the name and the task of “the thought to come” as the con-
ceiving of “an absolutely profane life which has attained the perfection of its 
own potential and of its own communicability and over which sovereignty 
and law no longer have any hold” (MWE, 114–15/91). As we saw above, 
much depends on properly understanding what Agamben sees under the 
sign of the profane and of what he calls here “an absolutely profane life.” 
In one of Agamben’s very first published essays, from 1966, he refers to 
our modern world as one where “a total abolition [abolizione totale] of the 
sacred” has been brought about.   This is a position that he has radically 
altered. Appearances notwithstanding, a total abolition of the sacred has, 
in Agamben’s view, by no means taken place. While the sacred has, in our 
secularized age, indeed receded from view, this has not meant its more or 
less total abolishment, only that it has taken on subtler forms. What Agam-
ben sees in the ambiguous figure of homo sacer that gave his project its 
impetus and title, and that he glimpsed in the interstices between the two 
Greek terms for life, zo  and bios, is “a figure of the sacred that, before or 
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beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm 
of the west” (HS, 9/12). This paradigm is one that reveals that, far from 
abolished, the idea of the sacred is as present as ever in the divisions and 
distinctions of contemporary society—from the prisoners of Nazi concen-
tration camps to the detainees at Guantánamo.   While this “total abolition 
of the sacred”—whose other names would be “a profane order” and “a real 
state of exception”—has by no means come to pass, it is, for Agamben, 
what we must strive for if the “unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe” he 
sees as menacing our age is to be averted (HS, 188/211).
  Where are we to seek such “an absolutely profane life”? One of the 
most sacred members of Rome was the Flamen Diale. Agamben writes,
His life is remarkable in that it is at every moment indistinguishable 
from the cultic functions that the Flamen fulfills. This is why the 
Romans said that the Flamen Diale is quotidie feriatus and assiduus 
sacerdos, that is, in an act of uninterrupted celebration [celebra-
zione] at every instant. Accordingly, there is no gesture or detail of 
his life, the way he dresses or the way he walks, that does not have 
a precise meaning and is not caught in a series of functions and 
meticulously studied effects. As proof of this “assiduity,” the Flamen 
is not allowed to take his emblems off completely even in sleep; the 
hair and nails that are cut from his body must be immediately buried 
under an arbor felix (that is, a tree that is not sacred to the gods of 
the underworld); in his clothes there can be neither knots nor closed 
rings, and he cannot swear oaths; if he meets a prisoner in fetters 
while on a stroll, the prisoner’s bonds must be undone; he cannot 
enter into a bower in which vine shoots are hanging; he must abstain 
from raw meat and every kind of leavened flour and successfully 
avoid fava beans, dogs, she-goats, and ivy . . . (HS, 183/204; Agam-
ben’s ellipses).
“In the life of the Flamen Diale,” Agamben summarizes, “it is not possible to 
isolate something like bare life” (HS, 183/204). This figure offers a glimpse 
of what Agamben envisions under the sign of a total abolition of the sacred: 
a world where no tree is an arbor felix, because all are.
  In the fragment that gave Idea of Prose its name, Benjamin says that 
this “idea of prose” coincides with “the messianic idea of universal history” 
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(Benjamin GS, 1:1235). “The messianic world,” he continues, “is the world 
of general and integral actuality. Universal history exists only in this world. 
But this history is not written; it is a history celebrated as a festival. As a 
purified festival, however, it does not have the character of a ceremony 
and does not know any hymns. Its language is free prose” (Benjamin GS, 
1:1235). Universal history and the messianic world correspond to our his-
tory and our world in its every integral and actual moment. In this sense, 
it is “celebrated” and is tantamount to a “festival,” not one that divides the 
sacred from the profane but, instead, one that unites them. It is a festival 
without ceremony and hymn, and its language is a “free” one because it is 
liberated from the weight of a sacred and unsayable element. Agamben’s 
idea of prose, which is an idea of the profane and an idea of the messianic, 
is prose freed of the burden of the unsayable, prose freed from the weight 
of the transcendental.
  In the closing pages of Homo Sacer, Agamben expresses skepticism 
about the Foucauldian project of discovering a “different economy of bodies 
and pleasures,” stating, “Just as the biopolitical body of the West cannot be 
simply given back to its natural life in the oikos, so it cannot be overcome in 
a passage to a new body—a technical body or a wholly political or glorious 
body—in which a different economy of pleasures and vital functions would 
once and for all resolve the interlacement [l’intreccio] of zo  and bios that 
seems to define the political destiny of the West. This biopolitical body that 
is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the consti-
tution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life 
and a bios that is only its own zo ” (HS, 188/210). This “form of life,” where 
bare life could not be placed in a state of sacred separation or exception, 
is a profane life, one where bios would coincide with zo . It is thus not the 
“passage to a new body,” the discovery of a new body or conception of life 
with different attributes than those hitherto assigned to it, that Agamben 
is striving for, after the fashion of Foucault, but instead a displacement in 
our relation to the very concepts of body and life. Agamben’s intention is 
thus not that of constructing a new body that would escape the powers of 
capture and recuperation of a State system—as is often the case in Fou-
cault and, following him, Deleuze—but instead that of developing the “free 
usage” of “bare life” itself—a “free usage” that is, for him, best understood 
as “profane.”
  A life stripped bare is what the state of exception rapidly becoming 
the rule in contemporary societies effects and which our every effort, follow-
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counterfigure to this “bare life,” is, as mentioned, not zo  or bios, but the 
two brought together in indistinguishable proximity, and which Agamben 
calls “form-of-life.” In a seminal essay for the Homo Sacer project, Agam-
ben refers to such a “form-of-life [forma-di-vita], in which it is never pos-
sible to isolate something like bare life” (MWE, 9/18, translation modified; 
Agamben’s emphasis). This claim is, at first glance, difficult to understand. 
Earlier in this programmatic essay, Agamben offers a definition of such a 
“form-of-life.” It is, he writes, “a life . . . in which the single ways, acts, and 
processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibili-
ties [possibilità] of life, always and above all potentiality [potenza]” (MWE, 
4/14, translation modified; Agamben’s emphasis). Agamben’s conception of 
“bare life” is a conception of life that is not the sum of its attributes, or the 
chronicle of its history, but a life whose essence is potential. To reduce life 
to any one of its attributes, or the attributes to which society assigns it, fol-
lows the same logic that has been the condition of possibility for the exclu-
sion and violence that are the subject of Agamben’s work from The Coming 
Community to Homo Sacer and beyond. To think “bare life” and its essence 
as potentiality is, for Agamben, not simply to halt before some unthinkable 
limit, but instead to endeavor to loosen the knot that the logic of sovereignty 
has not ceased to tighten around our conception of life. What must be done, 
then, is to develop a conception of life, and of “bare life,” whose only nec-
essary and universal attribute is its very contingency, its potentiality and its 
ability to make “free usage” of that potentiality.
The End of Days
  In Profanations, Agamben asks a question he first raised in all its 
complexity in The Coming Community: “is a society without separations 
possible?” (Profanazioni, 100). The answer he offers is that the question 
as such is poorly formulated. “The society without classes is not a society 
which has abolished and lost all memory of the difference of class,” he 
writes, “but rather a society that has learned to disactivate its protocols 
so as to render a new usage possible, to transform them into pure means 
[mezzi puri]” (Profanazioni, 100). In an essay published the same year as 
The Coming Community,   Agamben refers to a “threshold of de-propriation 
[de-propriazione]  and  de-identification  of  all  modes  and  all  qualities—a 
threshold in which those modes and qualities first become purely commu-
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nicable” (MWE, 100/80, translation modified). This is the Pauline message 
that Agamben sees everywhere in The Coming Community—from Hei-
deggerian ontology to the preferences of Bartleby to pornographic films, 
where the signs of class are maintained but no longer carry any mean-
ing that separates individuals from one another. What these varied para-
digms seek to sketch are the contours of what Agamben called in a dif-
ferent work “a political community oriented [ordinata] exclusively towards 
the full enjoyment of worldly life [vita mondana]” (MWE, 114/90, translation 
modified).   In such a community, the ravaging and exclusionary logic of 
belonging, which dictates that one can only enjoy a community’s protection 
if one fulfills certain sanctified criteria—only if one is red, Italian, commu-
nist, or whatever else—is replaced by a different conception of community 
conceived of through such theological figures as the messianic kingdom 
and the remnant. What sort of world political method, to borrow Benjamin’s 
terms, is to be found in such a messianic vision? In an important essay on 
Benjamin first published in 1983 and to which in a recent Italian republica-
tion of it Agamben added a final page,   he writes, “To conceive of a human 
community and a human language which would no longer refer itself to an 
unsayable foundation and would no longer destine itself to an infinite trans-
mission” is, as he says, “certainly an arduous task” (La Potenza, 54). And 
yet, to employ terms Agamben used elsewhere, the understanding and 
the forming of “this empty and unpresupposable community [questa com-
munità vuota e impresupponibile]” is, for him, “the infantile task [compito 
infantile] of generations to come [umanità che viene].”   In such a concep-
tion, we have a task—but one that is completely undefined. And it is for this 
reason so “arduous.”
  A  task  of  this  order  should  recall  the  specific  sense  Agamben 
ascribes to the idea of vocation. In a chapter from The Coming Community 
entitled “Ethics,” Agamben writes, “the fact that must constitute the point 
of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no his-
torical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact 
or realize” (CC, 43/39). He continues, “This is the only reason why some-
49. Agamben links this “profane order” with the reflections on Guy Debord’s society of the 
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thing like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or 
had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience 
would be possible—there would be only tasks to be done” (CC, 43/39). 
The “post iudicium world” of a coming community is not one waiting for 
some state of affairs to come or some judgment to be handed down from 
a sacred or transcendental realm, nor is it waiting to reach an endpoint of 
dialectical progress. In the postface to The Coming Community Agamben 
wrote eleven years after completing the book, he underlines that “coming 
does not mean future.”   As in the conceptions of messianic time offered 
by Benjamin and Paul, the “time of the now” is one no longer waiting for 
its final form. In light of such a conception, mankind has no set and spe-
cific “destiny.” This has nothing in common with quietism, and the idea that 
there is no specific “task” to fulfill or “vocation” to exercise does not mean 
that there is nothing to be done. On the contrary, Agamben’s rejection of 
such conceptions of “essence” and “destiny” is done in the name of a time 
that is now and an action that is ours. What truly leads to apathy and quiet-
ism, in Agamben’s view, is a naïve belief in historical progress, like the one 
he castigated in Infancy and History. And this is the sense that Agamben 
claims, in Idea of Prose, “the one incomparable claim to nobility our own 
era might legitimately make in regard to the past: that of no longer wanting 
to be a historical epoch.”  
  In this light we can understand Agamben’s repeated claims that 
mankind has no historical task, calling, or vocation—whether individual or 
collective. The sense behind Agamben’s interest in the paradigm offered 
by messianism, and that allows him to speak of a “post iudicium world,” 
is the governing idea of no longer waiting for the fulfillment of a millennial 
historical vocation or the announcement of a new one. To speak of the “post 
iudicium” world is, for this reason, neither apocalyptic nor nihilistic in the 
customary sense of the term. For Agamben, it is our essential absence of 
determinate vocation that defines our human state and which is the most 
fundamental characteristic of our being in this world. As concerns his two 
most decisive modern influences, it is also the point at which Heidegger’s 
ontology meets Benjamin’s messianism. As Agamben repeatedly notes, 
“essence, in the Heideggerian definition of Dasein, lies [liegt] in existence,” 
and Dasein “is an absolutely inessential being, whose essence . . . now lies 
[liegt] integrally in existence, in its multiple manners [Weise] of being” (HS, 
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188/210, and La Potenza, 326). To see the relation of existence to essence 
like that of profane to sacred means to render the distinction inoperative. 
This  same  integral  identity  and  “integral  actuality”  that  Benjamin  finds 
between this world and the messianic one, and that leads him to evoke a 
“profane order,” is what Agamben tries to conceive and convey.
  It  is  only  at  the  point  where  these  influences  and  ideas  come 
together that we can see the coherence of Agamben’s reflections and the 
sense behind such difficult concepts as the “inoperative.” While inspired 
by Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, Raymond Queneau, and others, 
Agamben’s conception of the “inoperative” is more radical—and more his-
torical—tracing the idea as he does from Aristotle to the present, and carry-
ing it through to its ultimate implications. In-opera-tive means that there is 
no specific work (opera) that any individual or any society has to complete 
or perform. When Agamben says that mankind is “inoperative,” he is not 
saying that mankind is dysfunctional or that its natural state is one of a 
dolce far niente or apathetic laziness. On the contrary, this absence of spe-
cific work is a call to work for, indeed, the bettering of our world—because it 
will not better itself as a natural and inevitable consequence of the dialectic 
of history or Divine Will. This is to say, as he writes in an essay from 1996, 
“man is a being of pure potentiality [un essere di pura potenza], and which 
no identity and no vocation can exhaust” (La Potenza, 330). By the same 
token, human history and human life are contingent. To say that human 
history and human life in this sense are contingent is also to say and to see 
that they are free—free to continue as they are going, free to commit and 
undergo unimaginable atrocities, just as they are free to change the course 
of events and bring about a more just and egalitarian order.
  In this same postface to The Coming Community from 2001 Agam-
ben stresses that “the idea itself of a calling . . . or of a historical task . . . 
needs to be integrally rethought” (La comunità che viene, 91). What is called 
for here is not a general strike but a breaking with the millennial idea of a 
task to be completed and the need to form an elect corps to accomplish it. 
This is precisely the sense in which Agamben means—in what may seem 
at first sight an enigmatic formulation—that ours is the first era that is not a 
historical one. This does not mean because human history will end with our 
generation, but it does mean that a hitherto dominant mode of conceiving 
that history can—and should—end. “There is in effect,” writes Agamben, 
“something that humans are and have to be, but this something is not an 
essence nor properly a thing: it is the simple fact of one’s own existence 
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worthy of the name could never be simply a list of historical tasks to accom-
plish or spiritual exercises to complete. It must remain, for Agamben, pre-
cariously open.   Benjamin wrote, “nihilism” is the “task” of “world politics.” 
Agamben’s version of this remark is that world politics has no set “task” 
at all.
  In Men in Dark Times, Hannah Arendt writes, “what begins now, 
after the end of world history, is the history of mankind.”   With a similar 
thought in mind, Agamben notes in The Coming Community, “the life that 
begins on earth after the last day is simply human life” (CC, 7/12). The 
name Agamben gives to the profane order, to the life that begins after the 
last day—“irreparable”—is, as we have seen, not to be understood in the 
sense of “not being capable of being bettered” but instead as meaning that 
no magic wand or sacred scepter will come to end our woes and that we 
must cease living in the expectation of some ultimate event. Such a life no 
longer waits for a culminating event that will crystallize, dissolve, transform, 
or transubstantiate it—whether after the fashion of a dialectic of progress or 
an apocalyptic End of Days. And for this reason, all our efforts—individual 
and collective—should be directed toward what Agamben calls “the end of 
days that is every day” (Profanazioni, 30).
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